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The Rise of Big Data and the Loss of Privacy 
 
Anca D Chirita 
 
Abstract:  This chapter offers a classification of personal data based on the study of privacy policies of 
Google, Microsoft Windows, Facebook, Instagram, Linked-In, and Whisper. It argues that online price 
discrimination contributes to higher corporate profits and economic inequality. Competition policy 
intervention is therefore needed to curb this inequality that generates a false impression that a few 
digital giants are competing on the merit of their ‘highly innovative’ data-driven products and 
performance. The chapter argues that knowing a consumer’s usage, frequency, preferences, and 
choices disempowers online consumers.  
Keywords:  Digital markets, competition law, big data, privacy  
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explains why ‘big’ data matters and why privacy is now lost as a social norm. In its 
Opinion, the European Data Protection Supervisor suggested a consumer protection approach to data 
owned by monopolists.1 It relied on the essential facility doctrine of intervention where a smaller 
entrant is foreclosed because it cannot access the data owned by the monopolist. The German 
competition authority indicated that access to data is a factor indicative of market power.2 
Both the Opinion and the doctrine of essential facilities3 are now of little help to competition 
authorities. Instead, this chapter will evaluate the legal framework to clarify the scope of application 
of the data protection rules and elucidate whether competition intervention has any merit in its own 
right. Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the former Directive 95/46/EC will 
be mentioned before the chapter fully engages with the recent developments in the area of data 
protection. In particular, drawing on the risks associated with data processing in both Directive 
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EU/2016/680 and Regulation EU/2016/679, the chapter seeks to determine how price discrimination 
can actually happen in the form of abuse of personal data. The latter carries an economic significance, 
as through the misuse of such data, consumers can be left worse off when bargaining or shopping 
online. Further risks associated with the processing of personal data concern health, which could, in 
turn, raise life insurance premium rates. In other cases, personal data can reveal a particular 
economic situation, personal preferences or interests, reliability, or behaviour, which could make 
price discrimination much easier. 
The new regulation mentions the risks associated with online activity and the need to overcome 
different rules on the protection of personal data, which could distort competition. The major 
provision is one which explains that the regulation does not apply to a ‘purely personal or household 
activity’, including social networking and online activity. This is to be interpreted in the sense that 
data protection and supervision do not have as a purpose safeguarding the online privacy of 
individuals. This is significant since many influential commentators have long held that competition 
law should not become a regulatory tool for intervention in the area of personal data protection.4 
Nonetheless, the regulatory approach to data processing aims primarily to protect employees from 
businesses that process personal data and that could lawfully disclose such data to the competent 
authorities in the wake of various investigations. However, the present framework can easily be 
abused or misused. It is broad on potential data subjects, as it includes ‘persons possessing relevant 
information or contacts’. So anyone’s personal data could be saved for unknown purposes. 
The chapter moves on to critically review the position of mere silence or inaction in the case of 
default settings of social networks or web browsers to review the position of informed consent under 
the new regulation. The chapter argues that recent theories of informed consent place particular 
emphasis upon the degree of sophistication and the length of privacy policies, rather than affirmative 
box ticking. There are hidden ‘small prints’ or pitfalls, such as ‘improving customer experience’, which 
make it possible to process personal data without a just cause. 
The chapter examines Windows 10, Google, Facebook, Linked-In, Instagram, Snapchat, and Whisper’s 
privacy policies to establish compliance with data protection and reveal which distinctive categories 
of personal data are being processed. Existing evidence of price discrimination will be used to extract 
the pitfalls associated with social platforms based on trust and the potential abuse of consumer 
confidence that such data is safe from being shared with third parties. Although there are warnings 
regarding the selling of data, this chapter will remain focused on the big data owned by the three 
main companies, namely, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. The selling of personal data could 
potentially lead competition authorities to uncover the bid-rigging of markets for personal data, 
which could extend competition intervention to include more ‘secretive’ social media, such as 
Whisper, Snapchat, or Instagram. Installed software and browsers can also be used as a means to 
improve users’ experience, but the processing of sensitive and confidential data has little to do with 
this purpose. 
This author agrees with the merits of the dissenting opinions by the late Commissioner Rosch and 
Commissioner Jones Harbour, albeit this author argues that the EU Commission’s intervention is 
warranted by the enactment of the new rules on data protection, in particular, by what these rules 
have now left outside their material scope. Relying on Stiglitz’s theory of economic inequality, this 
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chapter argues in favour of considering data as the new currency in two-sided markets. While 
Google’s sale of its users’ privacy to third parties has famously been described as ‘Googlestroika’, 
namely, a ‘privacy derivative’, this zero-priced product5 remains problematic through the sharing of 
personal data with third parties. 
In conclusion, the chapter adds the abuse of personal data to the non-exhaustive list of abuse of 
dominance.6 The latter happens on online platforms, which are outside the scope of data protection 
laws. Such platforms misuse the trust and confidence of individual users by making them reveal 
personal data and by encouraging users to voluntarily consent to the transfer of personal data to third 
parties. Personal preferences or choices are later shared with advertisers and sellers and used to 
engage in price discrimination. Ultimately, data protection laws are useless in practice,7 as they solely 
highlight the need to educate consumers and raise awareness. There is, therefore, one active remedy 
left: the intervention of competition policy. Indeed, online price discrimination and booking 
manipulation based on users’ personal data is now a social norm. 
 
2. Why Big Data Matters 
All businesses, including public institutions, may possess and/or process some form of personal data. 
This chapter is not concerned about the mere possession of personal data by a dominant market 
player. Rather, it seeks to highlight how personal data, which is economically relevant, could be 
misused, for instance, through it being shared with third parties, in order to maintain or strengthen a 
dominant market position. Furthermore, this chapter also wishes to signal an eventual bid-rigging of 
personal data by colluding undertakings, including popular social media, under Article 101 TFEU.  
This chapter acknowledges that a potential misuse of personal data by dominant undertakings has no 
precedent line of case law. While its novelty could trigger this particular form of abuse to be affixed 
with an exotic label, as it sits outside the confines of traditional competition practice under Article 102 
TFEU, it is never to be under-estimated by dominant undertakings that actively engage in the sharing, 
transferring, or selling of such data. 
The author is grateful to the Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, for bringing data 
concerns to the competition policy’s discourse. In her recent speech,8 Commissioner Vestager said 
a lot of people tell me they’re worried about how companies are using their data. I take those worries very 
seriously. Privacy is a fundamental part of our autonomy as individuals. We must have the right to decide who 
we share our information with, and for what purpose. 
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The Rise of Big Data and the Loss of Privacy 
 
This is the first time that privacy considerations have formed part of meaningful competition policy 
rhetoric. And this rhetoric can also succeed when these considerations are properly identified and 
given an economic dimension, which this chapter will seek to achieve in the next sections. 
Nonetheless, in the 1980s, US scholars were preoccupied by privacy. While Posner’s concept of 
privacy9 appears limited for current purposes, nonetheless, it represents a historical moment for 
privacy. Initially, Posner looked at potential labour market asymmetries if employers were not able to 
have personal data about their future employees. Disclosure was, therefore, seen as mandatory for 
employees with criminal records. This context of employment relations led Posner to consider privacy 
as being ‘harmful to efficiency’ where a lack of disclosure could prevent an efficient exchange of 
labour. Similarly, Hermalin and Katz argued that, due to these information asymmetries caused by 
non-disclosure, an individual with poor health could opportunistically take advantage of life 
insurance.10 However, such cases are very limited. 
For Stigler, privacy is a subject of public policy,11 whose purpose is ‘the possession and acquisition of 
knowledge about people’. In practice, privacy acts as a shield that restricts the collection or use of 
personal data about an individual or corporation.12 
A notable academic commentator had previously remarked that  
the loss of individual privacy (…) is often framed more around an individual sense of unease at the surveillance 
of peoples’ lives than how a shift in knowledge about individuals to corporate hands should force us to re-
evaluate our economic models and regulatory tools.
13
  
This chapter raises no expectation that competition authorities will tackle the complex issues 
surrounding individuals’ surveillance at large.14 Instead, the chapter aims to elevate the normative 
value of privacy as an economic right that is not devalued by public competition enforcement as being 
solely a human right of the public, which has to be addressed elsewhere and through other means, 
e.g. consumer or data protection law. Beyond any doubt, competition authorities will have to adapt 
their traditional law and economics analysis in order to be able to deal with a monopolistic abuse of 
personal data in digital markets for two main reasons. 
First, it is uncontroversial to suggest that personal data owned by companies has, indeed, an 
economic value attached to it. In the words of the EU Commissioner, such data has become the ‘new 
currency.’15 Previously, the European Data Protection Supervisor recognised that while  
consumers provide richly detailed information about their preferences through their online activities (…) 
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Therefore, it is uncontroversial to consider the owners of personal data as consumers of online 
products or services, from search-engines, shopping, to social or professional media. While trading 
and entertainment follow different purposes, both can intersect each other; this blurs the distinction 
between private and public spheres. An axiomatic reduction of competition policy’s objectives to 
consumer welfare17 means that once a company sells a product for free, but the sum of its individual 
consumers pays nothing more in return than the naive confidence that any personal preferences, 
economic interests or behaviour will be kept private, this is an exploitative abuse. Through invasive 
techniques of data sharing, such companies are guilty of misusing personal data for extracting an 
economic profit. Personal, private data becomes then public data owned by third parties so that 
dominant undertakings can further consolidate their dominant position. This has absolutely nothing 
to do with competition on the merit. If a product or service had been promised for free, but the seller 
charges a bill for it later, then that product or service is called ‘personal data’: 
if just a few companies control the data you need to satisfy customers and cut costs, that could give them 
power to drive their rivals out of the market.
18
 
Second, it would be controversial to identify an anti-competitive practice where a few undertakings 
were to control big data but to use it to eliminate their smaller competitors.19 Moving in this 
direction, a recent joint report by the French and German competition authorities has rightfully 
identified that data itself is ‘non rivalrous’,20 while examining the existence of a sufficiently large 
customer base, network effects, and barriers to market entry.21 
While the orthodoxy of exclusionary abuse dominates past competition practice, it is by no means a 
universal remedy for abuse in the present setting. As revealed by various commentators, exploitative 
abuse22 often remains unchallenged and under-enforced, as it asks competition authorities to put 
forward evidence of any anti-competitive harm. For competition and data enforcers, this can easily 
turn into a daunting task of hunting for hidden evidence of data misuse.  
The European Data Protection Supervisor came with a similar exclusionary vision in hindsight. It duly 
acknowledged that ‘powerful or dominant undertakings are able to exploit “economies of 
aggregation” and create barriers to entry through the control of huge personal datasets’.23 However, 
as every dominant, or even non-dominant, company should take full responsibility for its datasets, 
barriers to entry are never the culprit of the real problem. Raising barriers to entry is costly for 
competitors, but, as digital products or services are offered for free in exchange for personal data, 
such dominant companies cannot produce them any more cheaply. Therefore, digging into a hole, i.e. 
the essential facility doctrine, and seeing dominant companies as gatekeepers of big data who 
exclude smaller rivals, is nothing but a false premise. The actual problem can be solved only by 
proving that the data in question is the price to be paid and that privacy can be translated into 
monetary terms. To put it another way, this chapter argues that competition intervention against ‘big 
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 See Pasquale (2013) 1009; for the contrary opinion, see Lerner (2014) 19. 
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 Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2016), thus the report relies on the old directive. 
22
 For the view that some anti-competitive practices may be both exclusionary and exploitative, see Bellamy and Child (2013) 
10064; O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006) 194; for an explanation of the two concepts, see Whish and Bailey (2015) 212. 
23
 European Data Protection Supervisor (2014), para. 3.1.4.24-25. 
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data’ monopolists should be based on identifiable economic harm to consumers of digital products or 
services as a result of exploitation of their naïve trust and confidence. It should not be based solely on 
crude and rivalrous exclusionary abuse through harm inflicted on other competitors who are 
attempting to possess the same relevant data.  
 
3. Privacy as a Fundamental Economic Right 
Many articles have already been written on the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
offering individual protection against interference by the state in the private sphere (Article 7) and 
beyond to protect personal data (Article 8).24 This fundamental protection creates an expectation that 
privacy disclosures are an exception rather than the norm. In sharp contrast, Facebook’s owner, 
Zuckerberg, has claimed that ‘privacy is disappearing as a social norm’.25 However, as the recent 
investigation of the German competition authority demonstrates, not even Facebook is immune from 
competition intervention.26 Article 8’s exceptional requirements, namely the fairness and lawfulness 
of the data processing, for a specified purpose and transparency, are to be considered as setting the 
constitutional dimension of privacy.27 The former Directive 95/46/EC28 conferred individual protection 
of personal data. Article 2 referred to ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person’. Following this line, privacy entails certain subjective attributes, such as the identity, 
characteristics, or behaviour of an individual. In particular, Article 6 (1) of the Directive laid down 
some fundamental principles of data protection. These principles aim to ensure trust, predictability, 
legal certainty, and transparent use of personal data by data controllers. The collection of personal 
data is rather exceptional, namely, for ‘specific, explicit and legitimate purposes’. Any data processing 
should be compatible with these purposes. The new EU Directive 2016/680 is more helpful in 
delimiting the above purposes, namely the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties.29 Recital 26 in conjunction with Article 46 (1) 
aim to raise awareness of the risks, rules, safeguards, and rights in relation to the processing of 
personal data. While ‘awareness raising’ resonates with the right of consumers to information and 
education, as embedded into Article 169 of TFEU, the economic interests of consumers are simply put 
into jeopardy by this lax approach. Again, the European Data Protection Supervisor had previously 
warned that 
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While many consumers may be becoming more and more ‘tech savvy’, most appear unaware of or unconcerned 
by the degree of intrusiveness into their searches and emails as information on their online activities is logged, 
analysed and converted into revenue by service providers.
30
 
The material scope of personal data processing remains guided by the principles of lawfulness, i.e. 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest by a competent authority;31 
adequacy and relevance, i.e. for the purpose for which data is processed;32 transparency,33 i.e. the 
right to know about the various purposes of data processing; and proportionality, i.e. data should not 
be kept longer than necessary unless processing could be reasonably fulfilled by other means. In the 
forthcoming section detailing particular case studies, it will be demonstrated how, in practice, big 
companies collect an excess of personal data.  
Under ‘data subjects’,34 the directive includes as addressees of data protection suspects, persons 
convicted of a criminal offence, victims, and other parties, such as witnesses, persons possessing 
relevant information or contacts, and associates of suspects and convicted criminals. Given that 
anyone could be within a circle or network of contacts, which could eventually reveal sensitive 
information, there is a greater potential for the misuse or abuse of data processing. 
Turning back to the previously alluded to risks associated with the rights and freedoms resulting from 
data processing, both the EU Directive 2016/68035 and Regulation 2016/67936 include a long list of 
potential personal damage due to, for example, discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, 
loss of confidentiality, unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, or other ‘significant economic or 
social disadvantage’. Some of them find a strong link to competition practice, in particular where the 
data could be processed for engaging in price discrimination. The latter anti-competitive practice37 
could cause financial losses during shopping or bargaining due to the misuse of personal data about 
an economic or social condition. Again, this demonstrates that, by ignoring privacy considerations 
that carry an economic significance, competition authorities could miss out on many opportunities to 
uncover anti-competitive misuse and abuse of data. Of course, discrimination can be based on many 
other subjective factors, such as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religion, sexual orientation38 
and so on, and so these are not necessarily used for economic or price discrimination. In Digital Rights 
Ireland,39 the ECJ considered that  
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To establish the existence of an interference with the fundamental right to privacy, it does not matter whether 
the information on the private lives concerned is sensitive or whether the persons concerned have been 
inconvenienced in any way.
40
 
Other sensitive data, such as genetic, biometric, or health data, could lead to the price discrimination 
against individuals in their daily life, for example, when applying for life insurance.41 For those 
competition authorities that have, in recent years, adjusted their enforcement efforts to consider 
aspects of behavioural economics,42 Regulation 2016/679 places ‘personal preferences or interests, 
reliability or behaviour’ in the spotlight of evaluating personal aspects of data subjects’ lives. The 
processing of such behavioural data could also lead to price discrimination. The same applies to 
aspects concerning economic situation, location, or movements. Ultimately, if personal details are 
known, those who possess them could engage in price wars based on someone’s economic, social, 
physiological, or health, i.e. genetic or mental condition.43 
So, how are these categories of personal data linked to competition? One of the most significant 
provisions of Regulation 2016/679 is Recital 2’s reference to the accomplishment of an ‘economic 
union’, to ‘economic and social progress’, and to the ‘well-being of natural persons’. While economic 
goals match competition policy’s goals, consumer well-being is, indeed, wider than welfare. However, 
having regard to earlier considerations, online privacy law44 affects the well-being of individuals but 
could be translated into economics of privacy. In other words, personal data forms an integral part of 
the economic calculus. Contributing to closing the gap between privacy and competition is Roberts’ 
recognition of a right to privacy, whose function is ‘to prevent others from acquiring dominating 
power’.45 In essence, this conceptual threshold advanced by public law matches perfectly the one 
used by the same preventive function of abuse of dominant market power under competition laws. 
Another significant provision is Recital 9 of the above regulation, which acknowledges a ‘widespread 
public perception that there are significant risks to the protection of natural persons, in particular 
with regard to online activity’. This becomes problematic because of existing differences in the level 
of data protection. It is yet another ‘obstacle to the pursuit of economic activities’, which could 
‘distort competition’. 
The material scope of the application of Regulation 2016/679 is reinforced by Recital 18, which makes 
it clear that the regulation does not apply to the ‘processing of personal data in the course of a purely 
personal or household activity’. This may include ‘correspondence, the holding of addresses, or social 
networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities’.46 As long as online 
searching, browsing, or social media interactions have ‘no connection to a professional or commercial 
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 For an excellent book on behavioural economics of consumer contracts, see Barr-Gill (2012) 7; on the limits of competition 
and the necessity of adding behavioural economics to include misperception and bias caused by asymmetric information 
available to consumers, 16. 
43
 See Article 3 (1) of the Regulation on personal data that could be used to identify someone after name, location, or online 
identifier and other subjective factors. 
44
 See Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, known as the Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009, [2009] O.J. L 337/11. 
45
 Roberts (2015) 546 (emphasis added). 
46




activity’, Regulation 2016/679 does not apply. This is of great significance for competition authorities. 
Many commentators have been dismissive of an eventual competition law intervention in this area 
without offering any compelling reasons for non-intervention. Therefore, by making a clear distinction 
between the public or professional profile of an employee and the private regime applicable to 
personal data, the regulation leaves untouched a grey area of big data owned by digital monopolists. 
The danger of monitoring individual behaviour or internet tracking or of profiling for analysing or 
predicting an individual’s own personal preferences, behaviour, and attitudes, could never have been 
made clearer than in Recital 24, albeit in a professional context.  
To date, there is no economic regulation applicable to digital monopolies that process personal data 
unrelated to employment or professional activities. Therefore, the above regulation becomes 
inspirational for competition authorities to discern the subjective factors related to the private 
sphere, which could later interfere with consumers’ economic decisions, e.g., online shopping or 
bargaining. 
Finally, Regulation 2016/679 clarifies the meaning of ‘enterprise’ and ‘group of undertakings’,47 
offering the right to an effective judicial remedy against a data supervision authority48 and the right to 
compensation from the data controller or processor for damages.49 Article 83 foresees fines for 
undertakings of up to 2 per cent or 4 per cent of their worldwide annual turnover of the preceding 
financial year in cases of infringement related to personal data processing, including lack of consent. 
 
4. Informed Consent 
An earlier report by the European Data Protection Supervisor found that mere silence or inaction in 
the case of default settings of online social networks or web browsers is not valid consent.50 It is 
obvious that prior consent is required before any processing of personal data can occur, and that 
notice should be given ‘in clear and understandable language’. Furthermore, whenever personal 
information is to be processed, individuals should be entitled to know about it.51 These 
recommendations have been included in Regulation 2016/679. In the same vein, ‘silence, pre-ticked 
boxes or inactivity’ cannot constitute valid consent. In particular, Recital 32 requires that ‘clear 
affirmative’ consent be given with a ‘freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication’ that 
the individual concerned agrees to data processing. Following this line, ticking a box when visiting a 
website, choosing technical settings, or another statement or conduct that clearly indicates 
acceptance of the terms and conditions of privacy, is deemed to pass the test of valid consent. 
Therefore, informed internet and social media users should avoid ticking any boxes in order to avoid 
agreeing to unwanted privacy terms. This is because the latter are notoriously very lengthy. As has 
been suggested, on average, each internet user would need around 244 hours a year to read about 
privacy policies.52 Similar to hidden terms and conditions of sale, statements about personal data 
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 McDonald and Cranor (2008) 17; for a similar concern expressed about onerous obligations imposed on consumers when 
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processing are concealed in the ‘small print’.53 As the forthcoming case studies will show, most digital 
giants have construed privacy using rather mysterious terms, such as ‘improving customer 
experience’.  
Regulation 2016/679 draws inspiration from the Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms when it 
requires the controller of personal data to demonstrate ‘pre-formulated’ consent in ‘an intelligible 
and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language’. Previous experiences with the 
interpretation of what constitutes ‘intelligible’ under this Directive require less sophistication, 
whenever possible, in privacy terms. However, under Recital 42 of the Regulation, ‘informed’ consent 
expects individuals to be aware of the identity of the controller and of the purposes of personal data 
processing. This legal innovation is no major overhaul. Knowing the identity of the data processor, or 
the kind of personal data being processed, does not make an individual immediately aware of all the 
possible legal consequences of placing trust in a social platform, of browsing, or of downloading 
software.54 Similar to the ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ conceptual framework under the law of contract,55 the 
Regulation disregards consent whenever an individual has ‘no genuine or free choice or is unable to 
refuse or withdraw consent without detriment’.56 Popular digital monopolies, such as Google, 
Facebook, or Microsoft, offer no free choice compared to alternative services, which could be of 
inferior quality, be it because they are as yet under-developed or less innovative or be it that they are 
so because such services do not process significant data from their users. Irrespective of what exactly 
causes a dominant position to happen, there will always be a significant imbalance between a digital 
monopolist and its users. As Recital 43 of the Regulation rightfully points out, there will be no valid 
consent ‘where there is a clear imbalance’, in particular, where personal data had been processed by 
a public authority. It is then unlikely that consent was freely given. A presumption of lack of ‘free’ 
consent will also operate if ‘separate’ consent cannot be given to different operations of processing. 
Alternatively, it is possible that consent was required for the performance of a particular service for 
which data should not be processed at all. Finally, this chapter argues that a modern interpretation of 
the traditional doctrine of unconscionability of contracts57 would be welcome in the context of online 
platforms and could bridge the conceptual divide between the inequality of bargaining power and the 
exploitation of weaker and vulnerable consumers. 
 
5. The Case for Competition Intervention against Targeted Advertising 
As mentioned earlier, competition law can address two main categories of anti-competitive practices. 
For example, it could potentially tackle the sale of personal data by colluding companies and trigger 
repercussions under Article 101 TFEU and Chapter I of the UK Competition Act 1998. There is some 
speculative evidence which suggests that data can be worth up to $5,000 per person per year to 
advertisers58 or up to $8 trillion when including other non-tangible assets.59 The European Data 
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Protection Supervision advanced that personal data shared when using online platforms exceeds, by 
far, €300 billion. It is true that users place trust in internet platforms, thereby contributing to the 
sharing of their own personal data for free.60 There is, therefore, a far greater potential to tackle the 
sharing of personal data by digital monopolists given the earlier discussion of the forms of acceptable, 
valid, and informed consent. Both Article 102 (1) (a) TFEU and Chapter II (§18) of the UK Competition 
Act 1998 refer to the imposition of ‘unfair prices’ or ‘other trading conditions’ from which price 
discrimination could be extracted and unfair terms be inferred. 
Earlier attempts to deal with a misuse of data by monopolists failed subject to dissenting opinions. 
The late US Commissioner Rosch had flagged up that Google’s power of monopoly or near-monopoly 
in the search advertising market could be attributed to its ‘power over searches’, i.e. user data, 
through deceptive means.61 However, Commissioner Rosch was sceptical about imposing on 
monopolists ‘a duty to share data’ with their rivals.62 Indeed, such a duty could even run counter to 
the new data protection framework in the EU. In the US Google/DoubleClick merger, the Federal 
Trade Commission rejected privacy considerations from its analysis.63 The FTC lacks competence over 
privacy, and there is no robust but instead only fragmented data protection subject to various pieces 
of legislation.64 In her dissenting opinion, Commissioner Jones Harbour65 considered the merits of 
privacy considerations. She rightfully argued that Google/DoubleClick will gain unparalleled access to 
consumers’ data as a result of the merger.66 The merger has allowed Google to track both users’ 
Internet searches and their web site visits. Similarly, Facebook sought to incorporate the information 
shared by WhatsApp users into its consumer profiling business model.67 
The above cases represent missed opportunities to challenge 21st century anti-competitive and 
strategic practices concerning personal data in digital markets. The Sherman Act became law in 1890, 
the Federal Trade Commission’s Act in 1914 – both antitrust laws are lagging behind the digital 
revolution. Objectively, Section 5 of the FTC’s Act on unfair and deceptive advertising alone could not 
have sufficed before the US courts given that a data protection framework is missing from the 
landscape.68  
Comparatively, the EU Commission has dealt with issues related to data in the 
Microsoft/Yahoo!Search merger case69 involving the acquisition by Microsoft of Yahoo’s internet 
search and advertising. The Commission considered that a new entrant will have to overcome barriers 
to entry and, as a result, could incur ‘significant costs’ associated with developing and updating the 
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search algorithm. The latter would need to have ‘a large database’.70 Although the decision did not 
consider privacy, it did raise a relevant issue with regard to the transfer of data by advertisers from 
one system to another.71 In the Google/Double Click merger case,72 the Commission emphasised the 
pro-competitive benefits in the form of network effects. The latter stemmed from serving commercial 
ads due to the ‘large amounts of customer-provided-data’ compared to the more limited amounts of 
data collected by competitors.73 However, the Commission was not concerned about privacy at this 
stage; quite the contrary, it went on to mention that the collection of data allows for ‘better targeting 
of ads’ by advertisers.74 Later, the Commission clarified that DoubleClick does not use behavioural 
data for the purpose of ‘improving ad serving’ to third party publishers or advertisers.75 Ultimately, 
the Commission eventually acknowledged that  
particularly large internet service providers could thus try to team up with advertisement companies to make 
use of this data under the restrictions imposed by privacy rules, but they could also try to use this data with 
their customers’ consent, for instance in exchange for lower prices.
76
 
While the Commission mentioned the legal framework of privacy rules, it did not thoroughly 
investigate the economics of privacy, in particular, targeted advertising. It simply assumed that 
customers could have sufficient bargaining power to extract lower prices.  
Another missed opportunity – this time in the UK - of dealing with an alleged online discrimination in 
the search market for online maps is Streetmap.77 It demonstrates how Google’s competitors are 
having a very hard time proving an ‘objective’ abuse of dominance78 on the basis of this monopolist’s 
exclusionary conduct alone, and why it would have been helpful to prove anti-competitive harm to 
consumers in order to strengthen the subjective, i.e. exploitative, side of abuse. Apart from this, the 
High Court of England and Wales stumbled when it refused to admit that, under Article 102 TFEU, 
there is no de minimis doctrine applicable so as to expect an ‘appreciable effect in the market for 
online maps’.79  
So is it right to believe that privacy is solely a consumer protection issue and not, as yet, a competition 
law issue? Consumers are often unaware who has access to their personal data; what kind of data is 
processed; and how, when, and where it is shared or sold.80 No individual consumer can stand alone 
in the fight against big data owners. Competition law is, ultimately, the proper solution to online data 
misuse or abuse. 
Critics have argued convincingly that competition law offers a ‘convoluted and indirect approach’ to 
online privacy.81 They have suggested that a unified enforcement of traditional competition and 
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consumer issues could ‘destabilise the modern consensus on antitrust analysis’, dismissing ‘rigorous, 
scientific methods’ to favour ‘subjective noncompetition factors’.82 In sharp contrast, Edelman 
concluded one of his seminal works on Google with an emphasis upon ‘decades-old competition 
frameworks’, which remain ‘ill-suited’ for fast-moving digital markets.83 
It is difficult to grasp how an assessment of market dominance will succeed without rigorous 
economic assessment and why personal data, preferences, and choices should continue to be 
misused, thereby putting online consumers at an economic disadvantage vis-à-vis sellers or retailers 
through third-line price discrimination.84 If consumers are staring at products on display in shops, 
nobody records their physical presence to later put up the price.85 Nor do sellers on the high street 
know how rich their customers are, where they live, and so on. If online privacy continues to be 
ignored by competition/antitrust authorities in the digital age, then calls will follow shortly to 
disempower them and empower instead other competent authorities that will, indeed, stand up for 
online consumers and deal with the culprits of personal data collection, transfer, sharing, or selling. In 
this author’s view, unlike their US counterparts, the EU competition authorities are sufficiently robust 
and equally flexible to effectively adjust to the needs of the online economy86 and to successfully 
protect European citizens as online consumers. 
At a first glance, the concern over privacy could rightfully be seen as the private affair of a naïve and 
trusting individual. If there were only one such individual, or just a few, out there, then consumer law 
would suffice. However, the reality shows that this is not the case. Competition law stands out as a 
branch of public law87 and, therefore, it cannot turn a blind eye to the sum of privacy losses by online 
users at large. The data protection loopholes cannot be taken to provide such a speculative, and thus 
enriching, ground for large businesses. 
A contrary, but commonly held, view dismissing competition policy’s intervention into data-driven 
industries relies on the mutual benefits generally brought by dual-sided platforms for both users and 
owners. In sharp contrast, the European Data Protection Supervisor suggested that  
often companies rely on and exploit big data by operating a two-sided or multisided platform or business model, 
cross-financing distinct services (…) these companies compete for the attention and loyalty of individuals whose 
use of those services will generate personal data with a high commercial value.
88
 
Empirical research by economists has suggested that it is uncommon for industries based on two-
sided platforms to be monopolies or near monopolies.89 Yet, the contrary is held to be the case when 
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it comes to Google’s search-engine,90 whose share of the general internet search exceeds 90 per cent 
of the market. Empirical research on Internet search advertising found that this market allows for 
‘very precise’ targeted advertising.91 Targeted advertising is often associated with privacy intrusion by 
advertisers,92 but could also go beyond that to interrupt the online experience of consumers.93 
Without disregarding the incontestable direct benefits derived by users from Google’s online search-
engine platform,94 the giant extracts nearly $74.5 billion in revenues, with a 17 per cent increase from 
advertising.95 In Vidal-Hall v Google Inc.,96 there is evidence that in 2011, Google extracted $36.5 
billion from advertising. Google’s mysterious way of gaining profits moves away from a ‘magic circle’97 
to a commercial platform where users’ searches are returned with featured ads. Advertising is 
supported by a bulk of data collected from Google’s users. This has led Newman to describe Google’s 
advertising as ‘a monument to converting privacy into a modern currency (…) based on particular user 
demographics and backgrounds that the advertiser may be looking for’.98 Another commentator 
expressed Google’s potential sale of users’ data as a privacy derivative, nicknaming it Googlestroika to 
add a public sense of state surveillance.99 In sharp contrast, two notable commentators regard ‘the 
monetization of data in the form of targeted advertising’ as being pro-competitive and not harmful, 
but rather, ‘economically-rational, profit-maximizing behaviour’.100 However, Evans, who has done 
pioneering work on ‘matching advertising’101 to consumers, took a more nuanced stance. While the 
efficacy of online targeted advertising in reducing marketing costs is incontestable, Evans recognised 
that the collection and analysis of data ‘raises difficult issues concerning the expectation of privacy’.102 
The analysis of targeted advertising, which has been made the subject of another economic 
analysis,103 has also highlighted the pro-competitive benefits of targeted advertising. However, it 
raised the alarm over targeting large amounts of data about consumers. It is believed that targeted 
advertising will often lead to highly concentrated market structures, such as Google and Facebook.104 
Ultimately, privacy could trigger the enactment of regulations that might be capable, or not, of 
limiting targeted advertising.105  
The next section will prove that Google is not alone in engaging in anti-competitive misuse of personal 
data. First, however, it is argued that the new information economics proves incredibly costly for 
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consumers since online service users possess only imperfect information106 about the real price to be 
paid in exchange for the freely available digital platform. This chapter agrees with Stiglitz’s theory of 
economic inequality in the sense that ‘increasing information asymmetry feeds increasing economic 
inequality’.107 In particular, this author argues that the above mentioned consumers, through their 
lack of information about their personal, behavioural, experience, and authentication data with which 
they pay their dues for the use of online services, perpetuate such economic inequality inflicted 
through price discrimination. Advertisers increasingly use techniques that target online customers 
based on data collected from their service partners, namely, individual preferences, physical location, 
and other characteristics.108 Ultimately, while targeted advertising increases corporate profits for all 
platforms, another study points out that consumers could, but need not, become better off.109 
The challenging side of the data misuse remains that, as the price for data is unknown to online 
service users, the demand, i.e. service, and supply, i.e. data, curves cannot intersect each other in 
equilibrium. According to Salop and Stiglitz, in such a scenario, any economic analysis of efficiency 
becomes obsolete.110 As rightly foreseen by Ohlhausen and Okuliar,111 it represents a clear departure 
from the conventional analysis of market price equilibrium. It is advanced that, despite its legal 
connotation, privacy denotes all kinds of personal data surrounding a potential buyer, who is misled 
into accepting a much higher price than the actual, real price that could have been paid if the seller 
had not known about that data.  
Speculations about financial status, preferences, or personal choice offer the chance of going up or 
down for select categories of buyers. Known as ‘data mining’,112 targeted advertising allows sellers to 
make differential advertising offers to a particular group of customers based on useful correlations 
derived from their past online behaviour or user location. As has been suggested, it would be useful 
to study empirically the role of social connections and geographic proximity in shaping preferences 
and consumer purchasing.113 
The Wall Street Journal found evidence to suggest that ‘areas that tended to see the discounted 
prices had a higher average income than areas that tended to see higher prices’.114 The emerging 
price discrimination relied on the assumption that poor areas have fewer retail options available 
locally so that higher prices can easily exploit online retail consumers. This kind of online 
discrimination experienced by consumers from poorer neighbourhoods has recently been 
acknowledged by the US Federal Trade Commission.115 The FTC’s report was endorsed by 
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Commissioner Ohlhausen given the impact of big data on ‘low-income, disadvantaged, and vulnerable 
consumers’.116 
Unfortunately, there remains a persistent research gap in the empirical literature on online price 
discrimination. One year ago, the UK Competition and Markets Authority had usefully commissioned 
its first research report on the commercial use of consumer data, albeit in selected sectors of the 
economy, such as motor insurance, clothing retail, and games apps.117 Although limited in scope, the 
report attempted to provide insights into consumer data, in particular, personal and non-personal 
data, such as pseudonymous and aggregate data. It also looked into the ways in which consumer data 
is being collected, namely, inferred, explicitly declared, or observed through users’ interaction. 
Furthermore, this report sheds light on the current use of behavioural data. A previous study had 
identified that even ‘unstructured’ data extracted from individuals’ browsing history could reveal 
relevant economic interests,118 from which wealth status could also be inferred. 
Overall, there are too many data-driven platforms available which are capable of sharing economically 
relevant data for the purpose of price discrimination. This has recently led one commentator119 to 
suggest the emergence of serious accountability issues due to the fact that it will often be impossible 
to identify any leak of personal data. Big corporations like Google, Facebook, Yahoo!, and Microsoft 
have used a combination of big data predictive economics models with sophisticated mechanisms to 
study individual decisions with reference to key variables.120 Einav and Levin agree that an enormous 
amount of data increases the likelihood of identifying which ads to show.121 
Professor Klock had critically captured the perils of price discrimination, i.e. ‘where one set of 
consumers is unknowingly paying more for the same product than others’ as being ‘a clear sign of 
failure in the marketplace that calls for governmental intervention’.122 
On the basis of the arguments exposed earlier, this chapter first argues that online price 
discrimination contributes to higher corporate profits and economic inequality. Second, it argues that 
competition policy intervention is therefore needed to curb this economic inequality that generates a 
false impression that a few digital giants are competing on the merit of their ‘highly innovative’ data-
driven products and performance. Third, this chapter argues that dominant digital monopolies 
compete on the basis of their online users’ personal, economically relevant, and sensitive bulk of 
collected data. This innovative IT engineering, which has already won solid corporate profits, should 
no longer pass unobserved by competition authorities’ investigations. 
Finally, the negative effects of price discrimination on consumers have recently been acknowledged 
by the OECD, namely that  
‘consumers may be increasingly facing a loss of control over their data, and their privacy; they are confronted 
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6. A Comparative Assessment of Empirical Case Studies of Privacy 
 
The following section is dedicated to exploring how privacy policies work in practice for consumers of 
online products or services. In the economic literature, it has already been advanced that there is no 
empirical basis which could demonstrate that ‘large online platforms are likely to collect more data’, 
including more sensitive data,124 than their smaller counterparts. This section seeks to investigate the 
privacy policies of four major online platforms, namely, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and Linked-In. It 
will primarily focus on the categories of data being collected, the sharing of such data, consent, and 
disclosure. As during the writing of this chapter it became clear that smaller competing online 
platform were also important, Instagram, Snapchat and Whisper are also included. Rather than based 
on any other criterion, due to this author’s personal preference, Google tops the table below, which 
presents an overall picture of the findings. 
 
Privacy Policies Collected Data Data Sharing with Disclosures Consent 
Google i. personal data until June 2015 
& personal search queries; 
ii. behavioural data; 
iii. experience data, i.e. 
cookies, Google Analytics 
tracking via DoubleClick; 
iv. economically relevant data, 
i.e. interactive advertising;125 






ii. aggregated data with 
publishers, advertisers 
or connect sites. 
a) meeting legal 
requirements or  a 
governmental request;  
b) investigating 
violations; 
c) detecting or 
preventing fraud, 
security or technical 
issues; 
d) protecting own 
interests or that of its 
users.  
Required. 
Opt-in  for  








i. personal data until Jan. 2016; 
ii. behavioural data; 
iii. experience, i.e. cookies, incl. 
targeted advertising; 
iv. device-specific (IT) 
 Authentication 
i. thirds until Jan 2016;  
ii. controlled affiliates, 
subsidiaries, vendors. 
a) legal disclosure;  
b) users’ protection 
against spam, fraud; 





Facebook i) personal data; 
ii) experience and usage data, 
i.e. visualised content, personal 
engagement, user frequency 
and duration; 
iii) specific location data; 
iv) behavioural data from third 
party advertisers through 
‘relevant ads on and off’ 
service.  
 
i) companies that are 
part of Facebook; and 
ii) integrated third party 
apps, websites or other 
services, including third 
party advertisers. 
 
a) legal request, i.e. 
search warrant, court 
order or subpoena; 
b) where the law so 
requires , incl. from 
jurisdictions outside of 
the US; 
c) detecting, preventing 
and addressing fraud or 
other illegal activity; 
d) its own protection or 
that of others;  
e) preventing death or 
imminent bodily harm.  
 
Permission required for 
sharing personally 
identifiable data with 
third party advertisers 
or analytics partners;  
No consent for: 
i) targeted advertising 
and aggregated data 
transfer, i.e. age, sex, 
location, and personal 
preference, to vendors, 
service providers and 
business partners; 
ii) transferring personal 
data to countries 
outside the EEA. 
 
Instagram i) personal data; 
ii) analytics of personally non-
identifiable data , i.e. traffic, 
i) personal, experience, 
local and behavioural 
data with businesses 
a) in response to a legal 
request, i.e. search 
warrant, court order or 
Consent for  
i) renting or selling data 
to third parties; 
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usage, interactions; 
iii) experience data , i.e. 
cookies, local storage; 
iv) behavioural data , i.e. 
serving ads; 
v) location data, incl. unique 
device identifiers; 
vi) aggregated data, i.e. total 
number of visitors, traffic and 
demographic patterns. 
 
that are legally part of 
the same group and its 
affiliates;  
ii) experience and 
location data with 
thirds; 
iii) anonymized data for 
targeted 
advertisements and 




b) when the law so 
requires;  
c) detecting, preventing 
and addressing fraud 
and other illegal 
activity;  
d) protecting itself and 
its users; and  
e) preventing death or 
imminent bodily harm.  
ii) transferring personal 
data to another 
jurisdiction. 
Linked-In i. personal data; 
ii. experience data, i.e. cookies; 
iii. behaviour data, i.e. targeted 
advertising; 
iv. inferred and aggregated 
data. 
v. location data. 
 
i) affiliates; 
ii) third parties, i.e. 
publishers and 
advertisers; 
No renting or selling of 
personal data. 
a) where permitted by 
law; 
b) reasonably 
necessary to comply 




d) responding to claims 
of violations; 
e) its own interest or 
that of its users. 
i) assumed consent for 
service functionality; 
ii. separate permission, 
ie opt-in consent for 
personal use of cookies 
by third party 
advertisers and ad 
networks; 
iii. opt-out from target 
advertising only, but 
not from general 
advertising; 
iv. presumed consent, 
i.e. express and 
voluntary acceptance of 
its user agreement. 
 
Whisper i. Usage data; 
ii. location data; 
iii. behavioural data to 
personalise user’s experience; 
iv. device-specific data , i.e. 
unique device identifier; 
v. experience data, incl. 
previous URLs. 
i) other users and the 
public; 
ii) other nearby users 
location data; 
iii) vendors, consultants 
and other service 
providers;  
iv) as a result of M&A;  
v) current and future 
affiliates, subsidiaries 
and other companies; 
vi) third parties: 
aggregated data. 
a) in good faith, where 
it is necessary to 




i. with consent, i.e. 
location;  
ii. no consent for 
behavioural or 
aggregated data, incl. 
for analytics and 
advertising. 
iii. opting out of having 
web browsing used for 
behavioural advertising.  
iv. on Android, mobile, 
‘Limit Ad Tracking’ 




6.1. A Comparative Assessment and Classification of the ‘Big Data’ Collection 
This chapter proposes the following classification of big data on the basis of a comparative analysis of 
the data collected by multi-sided online platforms. First, this chapter argues that behavioural, usage 
and content, experience, technical, and location data are all sub-categories of personal data, albeit 
indirectly, compared to more direct, or highly sensitive, personal data. Aggregated data belong to the 
category of inferred data from any of the above. Second, the chapter wishes to advance that there is 
a real danger stemming from the abuse of objectively established commercial justifications of 
improving security, functionality, or service experience through recent attempts to authenticate users 
for targeted advertising. The latter fully exploits users’ economic behaviour and trust, and their lack of 
education and awareness. Third, this chapter recognises exploitative abuse based on behavioural 
economics as a competition issue while viewing the remaining abuse as belonging to consumer law. 
The author also recognises that economists could still be irritated by the third proposition, as they 




division of competition, consumer, or data protection laws. In the same spirit, a recent EU soft law 
communication acknowledges that online platforms are incredibly complex, being subject to 
competition and consumer law, personal data, and marketing law, and to the Digital Single Market’s 
freedom for ‘data-driven innovation’.126 
 
6.1.1 Direct Personal Data 
Up to January 2015127 and June 2015,128 Microsoft and Google collected personal data from their 
users of Windows 10 and search-engine respectively, such as name and email. However, Google 
encrypts many of its services, restricting access to personal data to its own employees, contractors, 
and agents only. Linked-In collects personal data, such as email address book, mobile device contacts, 
or calendar, in order to offer its users a ‘personalised and relevant experience’. Facebook collects 
personal data used by its users for signing up. Owned by Facebook since September 2012, Instagram 
also collects personal data, i.e. email address. Surprisingly, Snapchat collects personal data, ie email 
address, phone number, and even date of birth. Only Whisper does not collect personal data, as a 
username is different from the user’s real name. 
 
6.1.2 Highly Sensitive Personal Data 
Google claims that it did not use cookies or similar technologies for sensitive data, i.e. race, religion, 
sexual orientation, or health. However, its users cannot disable cookies if Google’s services are to 
function properly. 
 
6.1.3. Behavioural Data 
 Microsoft collects behavioural data, such as users’ preferences and interests, while Google collects 
similar data, which could reveal ‘more complex things’ and have an economic significance, i.e. most 
useful ads, people who matter most, or ‘likes’ for YouTube videos. Similarly, Linked-In collects 
behavioural data ‘to learn about’ its users’ interests, while Whisper collects the same data129 intended 
‘to personalize user experience’. 
 
6.1.4 Content and Usage Data  
Microsoft collects usage data, such as browsing and search history, while Google collects logging data 
about how often users made use of its search engine and their own personal search queries. In 
addition, Google now stores personal data from its users’ browser, including HTML, and application 
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data caches. Even more invasive of its users’ privacy is the fact that Google combines personal data 
from one of its multiple innovative services with that from another. Likewise, Facebook collects the 
content provided when individuals use its service, including any messages and communications, the 
location and data of a photo, and usage data, such as the types of visualised content, personal 
engagement, frequency, or duration.  
According to its privacy policy as of January 2013, Instagram collects content data, i.e. photos, 
comments, and communications, and usage data, including browsing. The latter are passed on to 
third parties to ‘personalize’ content and ads. Instagram uses third party analytics to measure service 
traffic and usage trends, like URLs, number of clicks, interactions, and viewed pages. However, 
Instagram claims that its analytics data are not used to identify a particular user. Snapchat also 
collects usage data, namely, social interactions, communications, messages, and content. According 
to its latest privacy policy of March 2016, Whisper collects usage data, i.e. content, publicly available 
replies and chat messages, and interactions. 
 
6.1.5 Technical versus Authentication Data 
 Microsoft, Google, and Snapchat collect device-specific data, while Facebook collects device 
identifiers. However, while Microsoft collects IT data about device configuration, Google collects 
more comprehensive data, including the operating system, unique device identifiers, mobile network, 
and phone number. Since March 2016, Google associates the unique device identifier or phone 
number with a user’s account. Likewise, Linked-In, Instagram, Snapchat, and Whisper collect mobile 
device identifiers for data authentication, which for Snapchat, includes advertising and unique device 
identifiers.  
 
6.1.6. Location versus Authentication Data 
Microsoft and Google collect location data. However, Google collects data that can uniquely identify a 
user’s actual location, such as IP address, GPS, Wi-Fi access points, and mobile towers.130 In contrast, 
Linked-In collects location data for targeting its users with local jobs or for the purpose of fraud 
prevention and security. Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat collect location data, including specific 
(Facebook) or precise (Snapchat) location data. Finally, Whisper collects past and present location 
data or at least an approximate geographic location. 
But why would anyone track users’ locations? In the US re Aaron’s, Inc case,131 the franchisees of a 
rent-to-own dealer of leased computers used computer software to track customers’ locations, 
capture webcam images, and activate keylogging software to steal login credentials for email 
accounts and financial and media sites. Evans suggested that, compared to larger companies, 
individuals browsing from home are most exposed to targeted advertising, as they maintain a unique 
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IP address over time.132 Bergemann and Bonatti advanced an insightful economic model of 
profitability based on IP address tracking by online advertisers.133 
 
6.1.7 Objectively Justifiable Personalised Service Experience versus Authentication Data 
The majority of the corporations under review, namely, Microsoft, Google, Linked-In, Snapchat, and 
Whisper, collect experience data, store users’ preferences and settings and, eventually, authenticate 
them for fraud detection. Microsoft last updated its privacy policy in January 2016. It now claims to 
collect data to operate effectively and provide its users with the best service experience. While the 
latter purpose is entirely and objectively justifiable, Microsoft aims not only to improve but also to 
personalise its users’ experience. The latter seems problematic, as any attempt to personalise data 
will, in turn, compromise privacy.  
Google collects cookies, which uniquely identify its users’ browser, local web storage, and data 
caches. At a first glance, this is objectively justifiable for improving services for users, namely, by 
showing them more relevant search results or making the sharing with other users quicker and easier. 
For this purpose alone, Google collects a vast array of information that figures out ‘basic stuff’, eg 
spoken language. However, there are blurring boundaries between improving users’ experience and 
authenticating them. Apart from this, Google pursues its own objective commercial interests, namely, 
to provide, maintain, protect, and improve its services and develop new ones, and to protect its own 
users.  Similarly, Linked-In collects objectively justifiable data from users to improve their experience 
and increase their security. Instagram collects experience data, including local storage. Snapchat 
collects unique advertising identifiers about its users’ online activities. However, it claims that such 
data is used to monitor and analyse trends and usage and to personalise the service. Finally, Whisper 
uses similar tracking technologies, including the URL a user had visited before navigating to its service. 
The Recent Report of the German Monopolies Commission reached a similar conclusion, namely that 
social platforms of this kind display an incentive to acquire larger amounts of personal data.134 This 
goes beyond what is objectively necessary for ensuring the proper functioning of the platforms. 
 
6.1.8 Targeted versus General Advertising 
Microsoft uses personalised data to help make commercial ads more relevant to its users. Google’s 
latest privacy policy of March 2016 acknowledges that the corporation collects usage data about its 
own advertising services, such as views or interactions with commercial ads. Most importantly, 
through cookies, Google also stores economically relevant data about its users’ interaction with the 
advertising services offered by Google’s partners or features that may appear on other sites. Analytics 
data is corroborated with advertising services using DoubleClick to generate further data about visits 
to multiple sites. Google Analytics is yet another powerful tool for businesses and site owners to 
analyse the traffic to their websites and apps. 
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Similarly, Linked-In collects behavioural data to ‘serve’ general advertising, through various 
advertising technologies, including web beacons, pixel, tags, or cookies. Furthermore, Linked-In makes 
use of targeted advertising based on its users’ public profile or inferred data; usage, including search 
history, read content, following activity, participation in groups, visited pages, and so on; and, most 
importantly, third parties, such as advertising partners, publishers, and data aggregators. More 
specifically, advertisers receive the URL of a user’s current page when the user clicks on an ad.  
Facebook collects behavioural data from third party advertisers when its users visit or use third party 
websites or apps or when they interact with third party partners. Facebook aims to improve its 
advertising to existing users to show them ‘relevant ads on and off’ its service and to measure the 
effectiveness and reach of such ads. Instagram uses similar technologies ‘to serve ads’ by advertisers 
and other partners.  
 
6.1.9 Written Email and Voice Data  
The following ‘reassuring’ disclaimer, which is used by Microsoft, is actually worrying: ‘we do not use 
what you say in email, chat, video calls or voice mail, or your documents, photos or other personal 
files to target you’. However, Google collects data about the time, date, and duration of calls. 
Paragraph 1.8 of Linked-In’s privacy policy on the use of cookies assumes that, by visiting its service, 
users consent to the placement of cookies and beacons not only in their browser, but also in HTML-
based emails. A recent empirical study has proved how invasive of privacy is the automated email 
content analysis by Facebook, Yahoo, and Google.135 
 
6.1.10 Aggregated Data  
For commercial purposes, Instagram monitors metrics, such as total number of visitors, traffic, and 
demographic patterns, i.e. aggregated data. This is in contrast to diagnosing or fixing technology 
problems. Also, Google shares aggregated, non-identifiable, data publicly and with third parties, such 
as publishers, advertisers, or connected sites. Facebook shares with third parties data about the reach 
and effectiveness of their advertising as well as aggregated data. For example, Facebook passes on to 
third parties data about the number of ad views or demographic data based on its users’ age, sex, 
location, and personal preference. However, Facebook transfers such data to vendors, service 
providers, and business partners in order to measure the effectiveness of their ads. Instagram also 
shares aggregated data which can no longer be associated with a particular user. Similarly, Snapchat 
shares aggregated or ‘de-identified’ data with third party advertisers. Finally, Whisper shares 
aggregated data with vendors, consultants, and other service providers. 
 
6.2. Data Sharing 
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Data sharing is possible both inside and outside of an online platform. The former could be as harmful 
as the latter in the case of a merger or acquisition. 
 
6.2.1 Inside Sharing of Data 
 Most corporations share personal data with their controlled affiliates (Linked-In, Whisper) and 
subsidiaries (Microsoft, Whisper), other companies that are part of the same group (Facebook, 
Instagram and Snapchat), or under common control and ownership (Snapchat). Logically, Instagram 
shares personal content and usage, experience, and local and behavioural data with Facebook. 
Snapchat shares similar data with the Snapchat family of companies.  
 
6.2.2 Outside Sharing of Data 
Until January 2016, Microsoft shared its users’ personal data with third parties, including vendors. 
Google did the same with third party companies, organisations, or individuals. Linked-In shares 
personal data with third parties, while Facebook shares service content, like posts or shares, with 
integrated third party apps, websites, or other services, including advertisers. Instagram shares 
experience and location data with third parties. It shares anonymized data with third parties in order 
for them to deliver targeted advertisements. Similarly, Snapchat shares personal data with third 
parties, which may include service providers, i.e. for quality of service; sellers, i.e. providing goods; 
and partners, i.e. functionality of service, or as a result of a merger or acquisition. Snapchat users 
themselves provide personal data to third parties simply by clicking on their links or search results. 
Third parties may use personal data collected by Snapchat to deliver targeted advertisements, 
including third-party websites and apps. Whisper also shares similar data with the public. In contrast, 
the recipient of a chat message could share its content to others. Location data is shared with other 
nearby users.  
On the basis of the above, this chapter identifies that data sharing to third parties, mostly advertisers, 
is common practice. Linked-In is the only platform to have placed a rather obvious disclaimer 




6.3.1 Subject to Consent 
 Microsoft and Google claim to share personal data subject to their users’ consent. Linked-In shares 
similar data subject to consent in order to carry out instructions by users, provide functionality, 
protect consumer rights, or comply with laws. Surprisingly, Instagram claims to not ‘rent or sell’ data 
to third parties without its users’ consent, while Snapchat collects with-consent phonebook data and 
photos. Whisper also shares with-consent location data.  
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6.3.2 Opt-In (Explicit) Consent 
Microsoft users are already signed in to receive targeted advertising without any prior consent. 
Google requires opt-in consent for sharing sensitive personal data.  Since March 2016, Google 
requires opt-in consent for combining DoubleClick with personally identifiable data. Likewise, Linked-
In requires ‘explicit’ opt-in consent for personal data collected directly by third party advertisers 
through cookies. 
 
6.3.3 Presumed Consent 
Linked-In presumes that valid consent has been given to the use of beacons and other advertising 
technologies. It assumes that, by providing personal data, Linked-In users have ‘expressly and 
voluntarily’ accepted the terms and conditions of its Privacy Policy, thereby ‘freely accepting and 
agreeing’ to such data processing. One disclaimer mentions that supplying any information deemed 
to be sensitive by applicable law is entirely voluntary. Another disclaimer warns Linked-In users not to 
become members if they have any concerns about providing data. 
 
6.3.4 Explicit Consent or Special Permission 
Google promises its users not to reduce their rights under its current privacy policy without their 
explicit consent. But isn’t it too late for getting such consent, since Google has already collected 
plenty of information about its users, namely, usage data, preferences, messages, photos, videos, 
browsing history, map searches, documents and other Google-hosted content? Under these 
circumstances, could it still be argued that raising awareness about Google’s search-engine and 
educating its users as consumers about their online behaviour would suffice to address the abuse of 
data with given, but less informed, consent? Most users can barely understand the legal implications 
of such explicit consent.  
Linked-In requires ‘separate permission’ for sharing personal data with third party advertisers or ad 
networks for advertising. Facebook requires similar permission for sharing personally identifiable 
data, ie name or email address, with third party advertisers or measurement or analytics partners.  
 
6.3.5 Opt-Out Choice 
Microsoft offers an ‘opt-out’ choice, informing its users to visit Microsoft’s opt-out page. According to 
Linked-In’s privacy policy of October 2014, in particular, its second commitment, ‘If you wish to not 
receive targeted ads from most third party companies, you may opt-out by clicking on the AdChoice 
icon in or next to ad’. However, according to its third commitment, ‘This does not opt any user out of 
being served advertising.’ Linked-In’s users are empowered to opt out of targeted ads only. They can 
opt out if they no longer wish their online behaviour to be tracked on third party sites. In contrast, 




for behavioural advertising purposes. On Android mobile, users have to choose the ‘Limit Ad Tracking’ 
feature to opt out of interest-based ads.  
 
6.3.6 No Consent 
Obviously, no consent is required from Linked-In for its users’ public posts. In contrast, Whisper does 
not require consent for sharing behavioural or aggregated data with third parties, including for 
analytics and advertising.  
Apart from this, there is further scope for trouble because Linked-In processes personal data outside 
the country where its users live. Facebook may also transfer personal data to countries outside the 
European Economic Area. Likewise, Instagram and its affiliates or service providers may transfer 
personal data across borders to another jurisdiction, which has different data protection laws. 
Snapchat may also transfer personal data to jurisdictions other than the United States. 
Finally, this chapter identifies as common practice users agreeing to give consent on a ‘take-it-or-
leave-it’ basis, without having any viable alternative to the use of cookies. Otherwise, the service in 
question could not work properly. 
 
6.4. Disclosure of Data 
The most commonly known ground for outside disclosure is where personal data is necessary to 
comply with any applicable law (Microsoft, Google, Whisper), rule or regulation (Google, Snapchat, 
Whisper); requirement or valid legal request (Instagram, Snapchat), such as a search warrant 
(Facebook, Instagram), civil or criminal subpoenas (Linked-In, Facebook, Instagram), court orders 
(Facebook, Instagram) or other compulsory disclosures (Linked-In) or to respond to a valid legal 
process (Facebook, Whisper) from competent authorities, including from law enforcement or other 
government agencies (Microsoft, Google, Whisper) and from jurisdictions outside of the United States 
(Facebook, Instagram); in good faith, where it is permitted by law (Linked-In); for the investigation of 
potential violations (Google, Linked-In, Snapchat); to enforce a privacy policy or user agreement 
(Linked-In); to protect customers by preventing spam (Microsoft, Google) or to detect or address 
fraud (Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat); to prevent loss of life or serious injury 
(Microsoft); to prevent death or imminent bodily harm (Facebook, Instagram); to operate and 
maintain product security (Microsoft, Google), technical issues (Google), or safety (Snapchat); and to 
protect its own rights and property (Microsoft, Snapchat), interests, and users (Google, Linked-In, 
Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat) or the public (Google).  
Finally, Instagram uses an alarming disclaimer that states that it cannot ensure the security of any 
transmitted information or guarantee that such information is not accessed, disclosed, altered, or 
destroyed. 
 
7. A Response from Practice: Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA 
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In Vidal-Hall v Google Inc,136 the claimants did not consent to the use of cookies on their Apple Safari 
browser. Advertisers used aggregated data about the claimants’ browsing experience to target them 
via the DoubleClick advertising service. As a result of this targeted advertising, personal data was 
shared with third parties. On appeal, the Royal Court of Justice established a tortious liability for 
‘misuse of private information’. Similar to this chapter’s advancement of abuse of personal data by 
digital monopolists, Vidal-Hall v Google Inc. has significant implications for the misuse of personal 
data through the online browsing activities of individuals. While the Court welcomed the possibility of 
awarding damages for distress in the absence of proof of a pecuniary loss, civil litigation of this kind 
demonstrates the risks to the consumer and to data protection laws if they are left unaddressed by 
competition policy intervention. The tortious measure could to do justice solely in individual law suits. 
This case represents a landmark ruling. It recognised the ‘misuse of private information’ as an 
‘invasion of privacy’.137 Unfortunately, when it interpreted Directive 95/46/EC, the Court suggested 
that the directive aims to protect ‘privacy rather than economic rights’.138 The same could be said 
about the reference to the misuse of ‘private information’, rather than of personal data. The High 
Court’s Justice Tugendhat had previously recognised that browsing information is, indeed, personal 
data, and that it could have the potential to identify the claimants ‘as having the characteristics to be 
inferred from the targeted advertisements by third parties viewing the claimants’ screens’.139  
The Royal Court of Justice recognised that ‘web traffic surveillance tools make it easy to identify the 
behaviour of a machine, and behind the machine, that of its user’.140 The Court went on to distinguish 
between two categories of personal data: on the one hand, direct personal data, including detailed 
browsing histories, and on the other, the data derived from the use of the DoubleClick cookie.141 As 
the latter includes a unique identifier, indirectly inferred data could have enabled the former, i.e. 
direct personal data, to be linked to an individual device user. In the Appendix to this ruling, there is 
evidence of the wealth of personal data collected by Google via DoubleClick, including economically 
relevant data, such as shopping habits, social class, and financial situations, but also many others, like 
racial or ethnic origin, health, or sexual interests.142 Unfortunately, Safari browsers have no ‘Opt Out’ 
cookies available that would enable their users to sign off from tracking and targeted advertising. 
The Court considered that ‘targeted advertising is inevitably revelatory as to the browsing history of a 
particular individual’.143 Given the limited appetite for awarding an ‘extremely high’ figure of damages 
for distress, ie £1.2 million, LJ McFarlane dismissed the appeal to the Supreme Court. The ruling also 
followed the US developments in private litigation. The FTC had settled with Google a civil penalty of 
$22.5 million because of the misrepresentation to users of the Safari browser that it would not use 
cookies or serve targeted advertisements to them.144 
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The above study of the privacy policies operated by some digital companies has revealed the many 
inter-related purposes of the collection and processing of the various categories of personal data. It 
identified that digital giants have, indeed, pursued nearly identical business models based on 
corporate gains from targeted advertising and exploitation of consumers as online users of a 
particular service platform. Indeed, the processing of certain categories of data is objectively 
justifiable for making the service in question work better for its users. However, other categories of 
usage, content, and behavioural data tend to be rather excessively processed for the benefit of 
commercial advertising by third parties. Knowing a consumer’s usage, frequency, preferences, and 
choices builds up a picture of their prospective economic behaviour. It disempowers such online 
consumers from any natural status of rational buyers while making them more vulnerable vis-à-vis 
online sellers or retailers. Giving consent and opting-in or out remain useful compliance tools for 
corporations that seek to stay safe from data protection rules. But can they also remain so before 
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